Using United States Antitrust Laws Against the Keiretsu as a Wedge into the Japanese Market. by Shepard, Julie A.
Global Business & Development Law Journal
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 16
1-1-1993
Using United States Antitrust Laws Against the
Keiretsu as a Wedge into the Japanese Market.
Julie A. Shepard
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe
Part of the International Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Global Business & Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Julie A. Shepard, Using United States Antitrust Laws Against the Keiretsu as a Wedge into the Japanese Market., 6 Transnat'l Law. 345
(1993).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe/vol6/iss1/16
Using United States Antitrust Laws Against the Keiretsu as a
Wedge into the Japanese Market
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 346
II. KmRETSU STRUCrURE ................................................ 348
A. History ........................................................ 348
B. Defining the Modern Structure .................................... 349
1. Inter-market Keiretsu ........................................ 350
2. Intra-market Keiretsu ........................................ 350
m . MODEL STRuCruRE ................................................. 351
A. Hypothetical ................................................... 351
1. Market Overview ........................................... 352
2. Business Operations of a Keiretsu .............................. 353
IV. APPLYING UNITED STATES ANTITRUST
LAW TO THE HYPOTHETICAL KEIRTsu................................... 355
A. Supreme Court Precedent for Exclusive Dealing Contracts ............. 355
1. The Clayton Act ............................................. 356
2. Applying the Clayton Act to the Hypothetical ..................... 357
3. The Sherman Act ............................................ 358
4. Applying the Sherman Act to the Hypothetical .................... 361
a. Plaintiff's Case-in-Chief. Anticompetitive Effects .............. 361
b. Defendants' Case-in-Chief ................................ 362
c. Plaintiff's Rebuttal ....................................... 363
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction ....................................... 364
1. The Sherman Act ............................................ 364
2. The Clayton Act ............................................. 368
V. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS ............................................... 369
A. Comity ....................................................... 369
B. Discovery Difficulties ........................................... 371
C. Potential Problems with Remedies ................................. 371
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................... 371
The Transnational Lawyer/ VoL 6
I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to open foreign markets to competition from United States exports,' the
U.S. Department of Justice announced, on April 3, 1992, a change in policy regarding
anticompetitive conduct that restricts U.S. exports.2 The Department of Justice can now use
U.S. antitrust laws to challenge foreign business conduct that harms U.S. exporters if the
conduct violates U.S antitrust laws The policy change enables the U.S. government to use
antitrust law as a tool to open foreign markets to U.S. exports.4
The justification for this extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws is based on
the basic policy underlying the laws:5 Their enforcement preserves and promotes
competition.' The prior policy, which limited enforcement to situations where U.S.
consumers had been harmed, restricted antitrust law enforcement to the domestic and import
markets.7 However, competition is international in today's global economy,8 and exports
are of critical importance.9 The Justice Department policy recognizes the significance of
1. Antitrust: U.S. Broadens Enforcement Posture on Foreign Application of the Sherman Act, lnt'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 622 (Apr. 8, 1992) [hereinafter U.S. Broadens Enforcement] (discussing the reasons for
the policy change and highlighting some reactions to its broader enforcement posture).
2. ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT THAT RESTRICTS U.S. EXPORTS: STATEMENT OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT PoLicY, IDEPr. op JUSTICE (Apr. 3, 1992) [hereinafter PouIcY STATEMENT]. In part the policy
statement provides that:
The Department of Justice will, in appropriate cases, take antitrust enforcement action against conduct
occurring overseas that restrains United States exports, whether or not there is direct harm to U.S.
consumers, where it is clear that:
(1) the conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on exports of
goods or services from the United States;
(2) the conduct involves anticompetitive activities which violate the U.S. antitrust laws--in
most cases, group boycotts, collusive pricing, and other exclusionary activities; and,
(3) U.S. courts have jurisdiction over foreign persons or corporations engaged in such
conduct.
Id. This policy statement in no way affects existing laws or established principles of personal jurisdiction. Id.
3. Id One of the motivations for announcing this policy statement was to correct interpretations of a
footnote in the Justice Department's 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations. Id.
These interpretations have restricted enforcement to where direct harm to consumers could be shown. See id.
(Statement of James R. Rill, Assistant District Attorney).
4. U.S. Broadens Enforcement, supra note I at 622. See, Douglas E. Rosenthal & Robert A. Lipstein,
Remarks at the Presidential Showcase Program of the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association
(Aug. 11, 1992) (transcript on file at The Transnational Lawyer) (discussing approaches that have been used to
address the problem of opening Japanese markets, including the infrequent use of U.S. antitrust law).
5. PoLicY STATEMENT, supra note 2. (Statement of William P. Barr, Attorney General).
6. Id. One underlying principle of antitrust law is that competitive markets are beneficial to society. E.
THOMAS SuLuvAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERsTANDiNG ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLCATIONS
1 (1988). There have been arguments by some scholars that the primary purpose for the Sherman Act was the
promotion of economic efficiency. I& at 3. While the legislative history of this enactment shows that multiple
goals were expressed, the consensus today is that the main purpose is to encourage competition. Id. at 3-4. In
its application of these laws, the Supreme Court has stated that the antitrust laws were enacted for the protection
of competition and not competitors. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
7. PoLicY STATEMENT, supra note 2. (Statement of James R. Rill, Assistant District Attorney).
8. Id (Statement of William P. Barr, Attorney General).
9. Id (Statement of James R. Rill, Assistant District Attorney).
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export trade and shows that its concern for competition will not be limited to the domestic
aspects of U.S. trade. 0
The U.S. has experienced years of trade deficits with Japan and has made repeated
requests to the Japanese government to open its country's market to exports." Even though
the policy is not aimed at any particular country, Japan's Fair Trade Commission Chairman
Setsuo Umezawa reacted quickly to the announcement of the change in policy and issued
warnings to the Department of Justice to proceed with care in pursuing enforcement.' 2
Chairman Umezawa indicated concern that the keiretsu practices may be a target. 3
Keiretsu refers to a type of industrial grouping which has developed in the Japanese
economy. 14 The industrial groupings consist of several companies linked together through
a variety of formal and informal institutions and practices. 5 The following are common
features of a keiretsu: (1) networks of debt capital; (2) stable shareholding and cross-
shareholding; (3) shared directorships and seconded senior managers;16 (4) executive
councils; and (5) common traditions and shared corporate assets, for example, company
logos.' Several types of keiretsu can be distinguished on the basis of the business activities
they engage in.'"
The U.S. government and some U.S. exporters believe the keiretsu relationships
promote exclusion of outside parties and act as a barrier to companies seeking to enter the
Japanese market. ' 9 At the Structural Impediments Initiative talks (SII),2° the U.S. and
Japan discussed the issue of keiretsu relationships and business practices. The U.S.
government urged restructuring of this feature of the Japanese economy.
21
With the policy allowing for redress of harm to exporters and the keiretsu identified as
a potential trade barrier, the issue of whether the keiretsu structure and relationships violate
10. Id. The Justice Department did reaffirm its commitment to the recognition of international comity and
indicated that if the conduct would also be illegal under the antitrust laws of the other country and that country
was willing to enforce their laws, then the Justice Department would cooperate with the other country. Id
11. Jacob M. Schlesinger, Japan's Saber Rattling May Be Just That, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1993, at All.
In 1992, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan was 42 billion dollars. I&
12. Japan: Head of Japan's FTC Asks Justice to Reconsider Antitrust Decision, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 9, at 688 (Apr. 15, 1992). See also, U.S. Broadens Enforcement; supra note 1, at 622 (reporting that the
Japanese Ministry of International Trade planned to launch a study to examine the policy decision).
13. Id.
14. CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 10-11 (1982) (describing the structure as
"the oligopolistic organization of each industry by conglomerates.").
15. PHASE I: JAPAN'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND OPTIONS FOR IMPRovING U.S. ACCESS, HouSE COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS, H.R. Doc. No. 332-283 vii (1990) [hereinafter PHASE I].
16. Id. at 50. Seconded senior management refers to retired or dual service executives. Id With the
intermarket keiretsu, the central bank may have retired executives that go to work for affiliate companies or
executives that serve in dual capacities. Id In the distribution keiretsu, the manufacturers place secondment
managers in the distribution sector. Id at 54 n.325.
17. Id. at 56.
18. Id atvii.
19. Mitsuo Matsushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative: An Example ofBilateral Trade Negotiation,
12 MICH. J. INrL L. 436, 443 (1991). PHASE 1, supra note 15, at 56.
20. Matsushita, supra note 19, at 436. The Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) was a series of bilateral
trade negotiations which were completed in June 1990. Id at 436.
21. See id at 440. The final report of the Structural Impediments initiative listed six areas in which Japan
was urged to restructure. Id The five other areas are savings and investment patterns, land policy, system of
production distribution, exclusionary business prices, and pricing mechanisms. Id
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U.S. antitrust laws has emerged.22 This Comment addresses this question and some
additional policy concerns which must be considered if Japanese keiretsu-ized industries are
found to be in violation of U.S antitrust laws. Section II describes the historical development
of the keiretsu and its modern structure. 3 Section III sets up a hypothetical keiretsu
structure.24 Section IV analyzes whether the hypothetical would violate U.S. antitrust law
if the conduct occurred within the U.S., and then explores whether subject matter jurisdiction
can be established.' Section V highlights other issues which must be considered prior to
applying U.S. antitrust laws against the keiretsu.26 Section VI discusses the potential use
of antitrust law enforcement on the keiretsu as a wedge into the Japanese market.2
II. KEIRETSu STRUcrURE
The keiretsu structure has roots in the history of Japan. Its predecessor was the
zaibatsu.2s In order to foster an appreciation for the development of the keiretsu structure
and its modem configurations, a brief history of the zaibatsu, the evolution of keiretsu
structure, and the profiles of its distinct forms must be analyzed.
A. History
A zaibatsu consisted of a central holding company which acted as the control center for
directing a unified business strategy for a large complex of companies, including other
holding companies.29 The companies within a zaibatsu did not operate for their own
individual advantage, but instead functioned collectively for the advantage of the top holding
company.30 The zaibatsu were all conglomerates whose goal was to achieve oligopolistic
positions of ten to twenty percent of the market output in a wide variety of industries.3' The
devices used to control the complex of companies consist of ownership or shareholding,
appointment of chairmen and officers, finances, and central buying and selling. 3
22. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Antitrust Extension is Weighe4 N.Y. TIMs, April, 16, 1990, at DI, D7
(presenting the debate that was occurring prior to the extension of antitrust laws and citing, as an example, the
Japanese auto industry which is keiretsu-ized).
23. See infra notes 28-62 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 63-91 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 92-223 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 224-46 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
28. JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 174.
29. ELEANOR M. .ADLEY, ANrrRusT IN JAPAN 20 (1970). The corporations together with the holding
companies are referred to as combines. Id. Some people use the term zaibatsu only to designate family-
dominated combines while others use it to refer to all combines. Id at 20-21. Unless otherwise designated in
this text as family-dominated, zaibatsu will be used to refer to all combines.
30. Id at 23.
31. Md (distinguishing this feature of Japanese combine from combines in the West which are built on
one industry or a group of industries with the goal of gaining a monopoly).
32. id at 28. In more detail, the devices are (1) direct ownership of key subsidiaries, cross-ownership
holding between the subsidiaries, and family share holdings where applicable; (2) direct appointment of chairman
and officers or direct appointment of chairman with the top holding company having final approval; (3) officer
interlocks; (4) financing on an intra-zaibatsu basis; (5) buying and selling through the zaibatsu trading company;
and (6) feudalistic loyalty to the top family, where applicable. See id. at 28-31.
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During the U.S. occupation of Japan at the end of World War 1I, General MacArthur
received directives ordering t he dissolution of the zaibatsu because they were viewed as
having influenced Japan's entry into the war and as a potential impediment to the
democratization of Japan.33 One of the primary means of accomplishing the dissolution
entailed outlawing holding companies, which the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
(SCAP) achieved when it forced the Japanese Diet to enact the Antimonopoly Law
(AML).' The AML essentially combined the antitrust legislation existing in the U.S. at
that time, namely; the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission
Act.35 Soon after the occupation was over, the Japanese government amended the AML
and allowed for cross shareholding and interlocking directorates, which had been
outlawed. 6 Holding companies remain illegal. These post-occupation amendments,
plus the fact that banks were not targeted by the deconcentration, 3' allowed for the
keiretsuka39 of the Japanese economy.4" Without a top holding company, the zaibatsu
were restructured on the basis of their banks.41 This new structure, the keiretsu, proved to
be a much more rational and effective business arrangement, but it is certain that this is not
exactly what SCAP had in mind when dissolving the zaibatsu.42
B. Defining the Modern Structure
In the restructuring of industrial groupings, different types of keiretsu were formed.43
Today, the types have been divided into two broad classifications, inter-market keiretsu and
intra-market keiretsu." These classifications are based upon whether the keiretsu firms
have a wide diversification of products (inter-market) or whether its companies embody the
successive stages of production and sale in a single or limited number of related industries
(intra-market)."
The reciprocal and interdependent relationships typifying the keiretsu manifest
themselves in various horizontal and vertical business practices.' The vertical practices
predominate in the intra-market keiretsu and generally include resale price maintenance
33. IR. at 4-6.
34. Michiko Ariga, Japan, in COMPErTnoN LAWS on THE PACIFIC Rim COUNTRIES JAP-I-14 (Julian 0.
von Kalinowski ed., 1991). The legislature of Japan is called the Japanese Diet.
35. Id
36. Id at JAP-2-13.
37. Id
38. HADLEY, supra note 29, at 72. Financial institutions played a central role in the formation of the
zaibarsu because of the partiality shown by commercial bank to their subsidiaries. Id. Therefore, it was a strange
for them to be omitted from the list of holding companies that had to be dissolved. Id A partial explanation has
been offered that it was not an item Americans in charge of deconcentration would focus on because U.S.
commercial banks are not permitted to have industrial and trading subsidiaries. Id
39. JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 110 (discussing the structuring of the economy into conglomerates)
40. Id at 174.
41. Id
42. Id
43. HADLEY, supra note 29, at 257. Groupings based on credit sources are called kinyo keiretsu. Id
Those founded on a raw material supplier and/or a product finisher are called kigyo keiretsu. Id Others where
the products were technologically related and transportation cost were high were called kombinato. Id
44. PHASE 1, supra note 15, at 48.
45. Id.
46. Id at 147.
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(RPM),47 rebates,48 exclusive dealing arrangements, 49 and liberal return policies. 0
Horizontal practices which characterize the inter-market keiretsu include price fixing and
market allocation.51
1. Inter-market Keiretsu
The most well known keiretsu are the inter-market keiretsu, which are also referred to
as the "Big 6."52 They are organized around a bank and include large manufacturing firms,
a large general trading company, insurance companies, and trust banks.53 These concerns
are linked more by tinances than by products. 4 The large general trading company,
referred to as the sogo shosha, coordinates some of the companie's activities and plays an
important role in both its exports and domestic distribution.55 The inter-market keiretsu is
also known as horizontal keiretsu because the members are nearly co-equal, and the structure
approaches the conglomerate style of organization.
5 6
2. Intra-market Keiretsu
The intra-market keiretsu are characterized by their hierarchical organization.57 They
are focused in a single or limited number of related industries." Their composition
includes one or more large independent companies, their subsidiaries and affiliates, and these
subsidiaries' affiliates.5 9 In general, they have stronger equity ties than inter-market
keiretsu, and these ties are typically one-directional as opposed to cross-shareholding. °
A specialized subset of this type of keiretsu, the distribution keiretsu, has been formed
by strong manufacturers and exists in a small number of industries, namely automobiles,
47. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (explaining functions of RPM).
48. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (describing the purpose and utility of the rebate system
of the distribution keiretsu).
49. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (outlining the various types of exclusive dealing
practices).
50. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. PHASE I, supra note 15, at 101. These practices are
usually attributed to distribution keiretsu. Id
51. PHASE I, supra note 15, at 101. These practices are mainly associated with cartels or industry and
trade associations. Id
52. Id at 50. These keiretsu groupings are Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo (descendants of three of the
major zaibatsu), and Fuyo, DKB, and Sanwa. Id at 51.
53. 1,d at 50.
54. Id
55. PHASE L supra note 15, at 50.
56. Id at 48. A conglomerate is a corporation that has diversified its operations usually by acquiring
unrelated enterprises in widely varied industries. BLACK'S LAw DICrIoNARY 301 (6th ed. 1990). Such individual
businesses are normally CDntrolled by a single corporate entity. Id However, the inter-marker keiretsu fimns
remain independent companies, which makes the links much weaker that American or European conglomerates.
Id at 48 n.310.
57. PHASE L supra note 15, at 53.
58. Id There are several dozen of these vertical grouping, and include such organizations as Toyota and
Nissan in the automobile industry, Hitachi and Matsushita in electrical machines and electronics industry, and
Nippon Steel in the iron and steel industry. Id
59. Id The total number of firms can be anywhere between 6 to 36. Id
60. Id at 54. In Japan, shareholding in non-financial companies is not subject to the five percent legal
limit for banks or the ten .percent limit for insurance companies. Id
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consumer electronics, optics, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, newspapers, and processed
food.61 They are generally formed around a manufacturer, integrated downstream into the
distribution, marketing, and sale of finished products, and result in a captive channel.62 It
is this type of keiretsu which this Comment analyzes in depth.
l. MODEL STRUCTURE
The discussion above demonstrates that the keiretsu structures are diverse and engage
in a variety of business practices. As certain features predominate in each structure, the
structures should be addressed separately for purposes of detecting violations of U.S.
antitrust laws.63
A hypothetical situation is outlined below. The business practices in which the
hypothetical companies engage resembles the distribution keiretsu for several reasons. First,
an antitrust challenge to the practices of the distribution keiretsu has a greater probability of
success than a suit against inter-market keiretsu." Distribution is clearly essential for
getting U.S. products to the Japanese consumers.6' Finally, many of the industries in which
this type of keiretsu exist are important to the U.S. economy and have been under study by
the Federal Trade Commission."
A. Hypothetical
The following hypothetical illustrates a close approximation of the actual consumer
electronics market in Japan. Minor adjustments have been made for simplification
purposes.67
Teltek, a U.S. corporation, has been trying to export its line of camcorders to Japan.
After complying with all importation requirements, 6 Teltek approached a variety of
wholesalers and retailers in Japan. Even though Teltek's camcorders are competitively
61. PHASE I, supra note 15, at vii, 54. Distribution keiretsu are called ryutsu keiretsu. Id at 54.
62. d at 54.
63. Id at 48. Overlapping of the different types of keiretsu exists. Id
64. See id4 at 56-57 (explaining that the inter-market keiretsu create problems that are more subtle than
addressing a "proprietary" distribution channel and involve fundamental aspects of Japanese business conduct
that will be significantly more difficult to change). Furthermore, in Japan, the growth of the distribution keiretsu
has been identified as an antitrust policy issue and a target for reform. Id at 56, 107.
65. Id at 56. All of the keiretsu impact distribution in Japan. Id
66. INDUFntY & TRADE SUMMARY, TELEVISION RECEIVERs AND VIDEO MONITORS, USITC PUBLICATION
2445 (Jan. 1992). GLOBAL CoMPETrrvENEss OF U.S. ADVANCED-TECHNOL GY MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES:
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT, USITC PUBLICATION 2439 (Oct. 1991). GLOBAL
COMPErfIvENEsS OF U.S. ADvANCED-TECHNoLOGY MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES: PHARMACEUIMCAL, USITC
PUBLICATION (Sept. 1991).
67. See ERICH BATZER & HElmUTLAUMER, MARKETING STRATEGIES AND DIsTRInION CHANNELS FOR
FOREIGN COMPANIES IN JAPAN 195-208 (1989) (supplying statistics).
68. Id. at 27. Administrative requirements placed on exporters to Japan have been considered non-tariff
trade barriers. Id- They include expensive, non-uniform procedures, non-transparency legislation, orders and
implementation, and approval authorities not accepting industrial goods which met international norms. Id Since
1985, Japan has removed some of these impediments and implemented simplified testing and examination
procedures. See id at 29. See also PHASE I, supra note 15, at 198 (describing other non-tariff trade barrier and
explaining the actions taken by the Japanese government to alleviate some of these burdens).
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priced and are of a quality comparable to similar products being sold, it has been unable to
find an outlet for its products in Japan.
1. Market Overview
The Japanese market for electrical consumer durables is strongly oligopolistic. 69 The
largest Japanese manufacturers will be designated as KI, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6, K7 and
K8. 70 However, K7 does not manufacture camcorders.
The seven that do manufacture camcorders occupy eighty percent of the market for this
product (See Table 1).71 Of these seven, the three largest manufacturers occupy sixty
percent of the overall consumer electronics market in Japan. Small and medium sized
manufacturers have captured seventeen percent, with the remaining three percent divided
among foreign impoiters.Z
The eight largest companies and a few of the medium sized firms distribute their
products through wholesalers which they own or through wholesalers in which they have
capital holdings.73 Frequently these goods pass through an additional wholesaler prior to
reaching a retailer. The number of wholesalers tied to each of the top eight firms ranges
from ten to one hundred (See Table 1)! 4
These wholesalers in turn supply over 60,000 retailers which are tied to the
manufacturer through some form of exclusive dealing arrangement (See Table 1). These
60,000 retailers represent more than eighty percent of the total number of sales outlets.75
Generally, eighty to ninety percent of the turnover of a tied retailer is generated from product
sales by the manufacturer to which it is tied. The remaining turnover results from sales of
products from one or two other manufacturers which have products that compliment the tied
manufacturer's line.
69. BATZER & LAUMER, supra note 67, at 195. Oligopoly is a market structure characterized by few
producers, or in other words a concentrated market. SULUVAN & HARRISON, supra note 6, at 32. This structure
allows the sellers to perceive that their interdependent action will be more profitable than independent action.
Id Interdependence suggests that each seller takes into account the actual or potential market reaction of
competitors before output and price decisions are made. Id Reaction, coordination, and strategic behavior are
important elements of oligopoly behavior. Id
70. BATZER & LAJMER, supra note 67, at 196. The eight keiretsu are Matsushita, Toshiba, Hitachi,
Mitsubishi, Sanyo, Sharp, Japan Victor, and Sony. kd
71. Id The actual individual market shares of the eight largest manufacturers of consumer electronics
in Japan generally range up to a high of 30 percent. 1d However, in some products, Matsushita has a product
share of up to 40 percent. kd at 224 n.24.
72. 1d at 195. In Japan in 1984, only 1.6 percent of the domestic supply of entertainment electronics
equipment came from imports, and less than 1 percent of domestic electrical appliances were imports. id.
73. Id at 196.
74. BATZER &LAUMER, supra note 67, at 196. For cost reasons, in the 1980's the eight largest companies
decreased their tied wholesalers from a combined total of 597 to 247. Id
75. PHASE 1,supra note 15, at 106 (Table 13). In 1982, 82.1 % of the electrical appliances retailers, 66.7%
of the cosmetic retailers, and 50.4% of the automobile retailers were tied to the manufacturers' own marketing
system. Id
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TABLE 1
CONTRACrUAL TIES AND CAMCORDER
MAmErK SHARE Op ToP EIGHT JAPANESE MANUFACTURERS
Wholesalers Retailers 
Market
KI 100 20,000 25%
K2 60 14,000 18%
K3 30 11,000 14%
K4 20 5,500 10%
K5 15 4,000 7%
K6 10 2,000 3%
K7 10 1,500 0%
K8 10 1,000 3%
Total 255 60,000 80%
2. Business Operations of a Keiretsu
In the following description of the business practices of the eight largest manufacturers,
K2 is used as the representative manufacturer. The figures for K2 from Table 1 are utilized
for purposes of discussion. This has been done in order to simplify the model and because
these business practices are to some degree engaged in by all of the distribution keiretsu.
K2 distributes its products through sixty wholesalers. Of these wholesalers, twenty are
owned by K2, and K2 has capital holdings in the other forty.76 In turn, these wholesalers
distribute the K2 line ofproducts to a group of 14,000 retailers, many of which are the "mom
and pop" type stores which predominate the japanese retail sector.77
76. Id. at 90. In Japan, stock ownership of 10% to 20% can serve as the basis for significant influence.
Id.
77. BATzER & LAUME, supra note 67, at 54. Japan has a unique retail sector which features a much
denser retail network than the U.S. Id There are almost twice as many retail outlets in Japan than there are in
the U.S., which has twice the population. l One reason for this feature of the Japanese economy is that for
years the Japanese government has followed a policy of protecting small businesses, with the goal of enabling
as many Japanese as possible to earn a living. Id at 52. This policy is furthered by the Large Retail Scale Law,
which due to its amendment in 1979, requires a consultation procedure for the opening of any store larger than
500 square meters, and this consultation procedure entails obtaining the approval of the small competing
retailers. Id at 53. The effect has been to make it virtually impossible for any sizable new store to open. Id
The limit on store size affects export to Japan because there is evidence that larger stores sell more imported
products than the small retailers. PHAsE I, supra note 15, at 74-74. Toys *R" Us is attempting to gain entry into
the retail sector by going through these procedures, and it is being viewed as a test case for other large U.S.
retailers. L at 78.
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K2 has arranged for these retailers to exclusively carry its product line, which includes
camcorders. Sixty percent of the retailers have exclusive dealing clauses in their
contracts. 8 Another twenty percent do not have such clauses, but K2 has extended credit
to them or holds equity in their stores, and, as a result, the owners feel obligated not to sell
a competing brand in their stores. Ten percent sell only the K2 brand because they fear
reprisals from K2 should they begin to sell a competing brand within their store. The
remaining ten percent cannot technically be considered exclusive dealers because they sell
a few of the products of a rival manufacturer which complement the K2 line. However,
these goods do not compete with K2 products.
K2 employs a rebate system to enforce exclusive dealing and to promote sales.79 With
exclusive sales cooperation rebates, the amount of rebate is dependent upon the share of sales
among competitive items and acts as an incentive for dealers to be exclusive dealers. 80
Additionally, there are rebates based on amount of display space.8 1 Other sales rebates
include awards for target achievement and opening new channels.8 2 Furthermore, the
rebates can be used by K2 as a means of insuring conformity with the manufacturer's
policies.8 3 A retailer may find its year-end rebate cut if it does not follow K2's
suggestions."' This rebate usually represents the profit of the small business."
The wholesalers and retailers tied to K2 have entered into agreements with K2 to
prohibit the resale of its products below a stipulated price. Some of these agreements are
formalized in contracts, but others are informal.8 7 This practice is called Resale Price
Maintenance (RPM), and under AML it is illegal.88 K2 has a liberal policy for the return
of unsold merchandise.8 9 K2 in some cases gives credit, and in others issues rebates.9"
One of the reasons fcr this policy is to ensure that the prices for its goods will be maintained
78. Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 . L. & ECON. 1 (1982). Exclusive dealing can be defimed
as a contractual requirement by which the retailers or distributors promise a supplier that they will not handle
the goods of competing producers. Id This type of agreement must be distinguished from exclusive dealerships
where a manufacture reserves a class of customer or territory for a particular dealer. Id n. 1. Unlike an exclusive
dealing arrangement, the primary impact of an exclusive dealership is on intrabrand competition. SuLtVAN &
HARRISON, supra note 6, at 178. A manufacturer will condition the sale of its product on an agreement of the
purchaser to buy all of its requirements for this product from the manufacturer. Id.
79. PHASE I, supra note 15, at 109-10. This use of the term rebate does not involve any payments to
consumers. Id. at 109. Rebates include practices that are known in the U.S. as volume discounts, cash discount,
and advertising allowances. Id 109-10. Generally rebates are handled on a confidential basis to prevent having
rebates compared with those of competing suppliers. Id at 110.
80. Id.
81. Id,
82. Id
83. PHASE I, supra note 15, at 110.
84. Id (quoting a presentation to the Japanese Fair Trade Commission).
85. Id at 110.
86. Id at 107.
87. Id
88. Id. at 107. "[T1he Japanese distribution keiretsu are unparalleled in strength and breadth. Today they
function primarily as a mechanism through which resale prices can be controlled by the manufacturers and thus
preserve de facto resale pice maintenance despite its prohibition under the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law."
Id (quoting Hideto Ishicht, Anticompetitive Practices in the Distribution of Goods and Services in Japan: The
Problem of the Distribution Keiretsu, 2 J. JAPANESE STuD. 325 (1983)). See supra, note 47 and accompanying
text (defining RPO.
89. Id
90. Id at 108.
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at a certain level so that the retailers will not have to sell them at a discount to get them out
of their stores?
IV. APPLYING UNITED STATES ANTITRUST
LAW TO THE HYPOTHETICAL KEIRETSU
Exclusive dealing and RPM raise the most substantial antitrust concerns. However, the
practice of RPM would not be attacked by Teltek in an antitrust case because the effect of
the practice is to maintain prices at a level above the price that would result from a market
free from restraint.' While this is a concern for local government and consumers, it would
enable Teltek, if it can gain entry, to compete in the Japanese market by selling below the
prices established by the RPM agreements.
The most likely target for an antitrust suit by Teltek is the exclusive dealing
arrangements. This includes the exclusive dealing contracts, the impact that the rebate
system has on maintaining exclusive dealing with or without a contract, and the potential
anticompetitive effects of the manufacturer's capital holdings in the retailers. In Teltek's
situation, this exclusivity has effectively closed eighty percent of the distribution channels
to its products. The thrust of Teltek's lawsuit is that the exclusive dealing practice of the
keiretsu has harmed Teltek by erecting a barrier to its exports in violation of U.S. antitrust
law.
The discussion below analyzes first whether the exclusive dealing of the keiretsu could
be found to violate U.S. antitrust law, specifically the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.
Then, this Comment explores whether Teltek could establish, under either of these statutes,
the subject matter jurisdiction necessary to pursue the substantive merits of its antitrust
claim.93 The answers to these questions will determine whether U.S. antitrust laws can be
used as a wedge to enter the Japanese market.
A. Supreme Court Precedent for Exclusive Dealing Contracts
Both section 1 of the Sherman Act' and section 3 of the Clayton Act?' govern aspects
of exclusive dealing in private suits.9 Teltek will experience a heavier burden of proof in
91. lad at 109.
92. See SuLuvAN & HARRISON, supra note 6 at 158-65 (describing the economic impact of RPM).
93. An analysis of the requirements for establishing personal jurisdiction in this context is beyond the
scope of this article.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1993).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1993).
96. EARL W. KINhER, 2 FEDERAL ANTriTRuST LAW 278-79 (1980). SuLuvAN & HARRISON, supra note
6 at 178. Cases dealing with commodities generally apply section 3 of the Clayton Act, and cases not concerning
the commodities have applied section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Richard, M. Steuer, Exclusive Dealing in
Distribution, 69 CORNELL L REv. 101, 103 n.12 (1983). Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission ( 15 U.S.C.
45 (1993)) also governs exclusive dealing. la, like the Sherman Act, this Act has a provision expressly
governing extraterritorial subject matterjurisdiction. Daniel T. Murphy, Moderating Antitrust Jurisdiction: The
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act and the Restatement of Foreign Relations (Revised), 54 U. CIN. L.
REV. 779,785 (1986). However, as the FTC Act is not applicable in private suits, a U.S. manufacturer is limited
to filing a complaint with the Commission, which will then decide whether or not to sue the foreign company
or companies. See Steuer, supra, at 103 n.12.
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an antitrust challenge under the Sherman Act than in a claim under the Clayton Act.97 This
results from the different language employed in the statutes. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
speaks of actual restraints of trade, while section 3 of the Clayton Act deals with activities
which may substantially lessen competition.98 Additionally, the analytical approaches
under the two statutes differ to some degree.99 The respective burdens of proof and
analytical approaches are outlined below, and Teltek's situation is analyzed under each of
these separate standards.
1. The Clayton Act
The two most influential Supreme Court decisions in the area of exclusive dealing,
Standard Oil Co. v. United States""° and Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,"'o
applied section 3 of the Clayton Act."12
In Standard Stations, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether exclusive
dealing contracts between Standard Oil and independent retailers in the market region,
referred to as the "Western Area," violated section 3.1°3 After analyzing the prior
exclusive dealing cases and reviewing the congressional intent behind the Clayton Act, the
Court determined that "§ 3 is satisfied by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a
substantial share of the line of commerce affected.""' Standard controlled twenty-three
percent of this market."0 5 Sales under exclusive dealing contracts with independent service
stations made up six and seven-tenths percent of Standard's total sales.' Standard
exclusive dealing contracts tied sixteen percent of the independent retailers in the area." 7
Applying a quantitative substantiality standard, the Court concluded that Standard's
exclusive dealing contracts foreclosed these channels to competitors, and that this six and
seven-tenths percent of the petroleum market was a substantial share of the market under
section 3.2"5 The court noted that Standard's major competitors, which comprised forty
two and one half percent of the market, also utilized exclusive dealing contracts."°
97. KINTNER, supra note 96, at 286-287; Twin City Sportservice, Inc. Charles 0. Finly & Co., 512 F.2d
1264, 1275 (9th Cir. 1975); American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3rd Cir. 1975).
98. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finly & Co., 512 F.2d at 1275.
99. See Steuer, supra note 96 at 113 (noting that an economic analysis is required by Sylvania and
distinguishing it from the Tampa qualitative substantiality standard.) See also, KNTNER, supra note 96, at 286
("After Tampa Electric, however, the practical difference between Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section
3 of the Clayton Act have nearly disappeared.-). See also, SULiVAN & HARRIsoN, supra note 6, at 183
("Tampa Electric suggested that exclusive dealing should be analyzed under an approach very similar to the rule
of reason.). See also Steuer, supra note 96 at 109 (indicating that the Court in Tampa applied some degree of
a rule of reason analysis).
100. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
101. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
102. SULLIvAN & HARRISON, supra note 6, at 180.
103. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. at 295. The Western Area comprised Arizona, California,
Washington, Idaho, Nev.da, and Utah. Id.
104. Id. at 314.
105. Id.
106. Id. The company owned service stations sold 6.8% of this amount, and the remainder was sold to
industrial users. Id.
107. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. at 314.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 295.
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In Tampa, the Court confronted the issue of exclusive dealing again, this time in the
context of a utility's effort to enforce a twenty year contract for all of its requirements for
coal from the defendant supplier."' The Court described the analysis required for
determining whether an exclusive dealing contract forecloses a substantial share of the
market."' The first step entails determininj the line of commerce involved. 12 Second,
the area of the competitive market must be delineated. 1' 3 Third, the competition foreclosed
by the contract must be found to constitute a substantial share of the relevant market." 4
In order to determine substantiality, it is necessary to weigh the probable effect of the
contract on the market in question by taking into account the relative strength of the parties,
the proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume of commerce
in the market, and the probable immediate and future effects of foreclosure on that share of
the market."' The Court found that the foreclosure of less than one percent of the market
for coal was not substantial, that there were no foreclosure effects, and therefore, no violation
of section 3V 16 However, the Court did acknowledge that it was not dealing with "myriad
outlets with substantial sales volume coupled with an industry wide practice of relying on
exclusive dealing contracts, as in Standard [Stations].""7
2. Applying the Clayton Act to the Hypothetical
In order to prove a violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act, Teltek must establish the
line of commerce, delineate the relevant market, and show a substantial lessening of
competition in the market. Exclusive dealing primarily impacts interbrand competition,
unlike other vertical restraints,"' and by itself will never diminish intrabrand
competition. 19
The first step for Teltek involves defining the line of commerce. In the Teltek
hypothetical, the line of commerce is camcorders. Next, a court will define the area of
effective competition. This is accomplished by ascertaining where the seller operates and
where the consumer can practicably turn for supplies.' 0 While the seven hypothetical
manufacturers all operate in Japan and also export their products, Japanese consumers will
predominately be limited to shopping in the local marketplace for such a product. Thus, the
area of effective competition is the Japanese domestic market.
With Japan considered as the relevant market region, it must be decided if there is a
foreclosure of a substantial share of this market. Foreclosure occurs where exclusive dealing
110. Tampa Electric Coal Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. at 321-22.
111. I at 327.
112. IA at 330.
113. Id at. 329. This is the area in which the seller operates and to which consumers can practicably turn
for supplies. Id at 327. The Court cited as support both Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949),
which applied section 3 of the Clayton Act, and United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948),
applying section 1 of the Sherman Act). Tampa Electric Coal Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. at 321-322.
114. Tampa Electric Coal Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. at 328.
115. 1La at 329.
116. Id at 332, 334.
117. Id at 334.
118. SutujvAN & HARpJsoN, supra note 6, at 177-78.
119. Steuer, supra note 96, at 109.
120. Tampa Electric Company v. Nashville Coal Company, 365 U.S. at 327.
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closes outlets to manufacturers."' In determining the degree of foreclosure, it is necessary
to look at both the percentage of outlets closed and the percentage of the total sales in that
market.'
Teltek may decide to sue all or some manufacturers. For example, seven of the top eight
hypothetical manufacturers in Japan have foreclosed approximately eighty percent of
thedistribution outlets and account for eighty percent of the market sales. This means that
forty eight percent of the market is contractually tied to the seven manufacturers.'2'
However, Teltek may decide for strategic reasons that it would be better to litigate only
against the top three firms. These firms have foreclosed over fifty percent of the distribution
channels and accotnt for close to sixty percent of the total market sales. Thus, these three
firms capture thirty percent of the market by exclusive dealing contracts. 2 4 If Teltek
should decide to pursue the latter course, the foreclosure in the rest of the market remains
relevant, as shown by the Court both in Standard Stations'" and Tampa.16 A court will
take notice of the industry practice of exclusive dealing, the additional outlets foreclosed, and
the percentage of total market sales attributable to these outlets.
In either case, a court should find a substantial lessening of competition by the
foreclosure of Japan's distribution channels. In Standard Stations, the court found
contractual ties foreclosing sixteen percent of the independent retailers amounting to a little
less than seven percent of the market. These figures are still relevant for comparison
because, even though the Court modified the Standard Stations rigid quantitative
substantiality test in Tampa, it did not indicate that the result in Standard Stations would be
any different. 27 Irt Teltek's situation, at a minimum the manufacturer's contractual ties
have foreclosed thirty percent of the retailer outlets and a similar percentage of the market
share. These contracts substantially lessen competition and will probably be found to violate
section 3 of the Clayton Act.
3. The Sherman Act
Exclusive dealing antitrust violations are generally governed by the Clayton Act.
However, when the challenged exclusive dealing does not involve commodities, claims may
be brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act.12 8 Teltek's claim involves the sale of
commodities. However, plaintiffs frequently plead violations of both statutes when bringing
121. SULtXVAN & HARRISON, supra note 6, at 178.
122. Steuer, supra note 96, at 117.
123. This number is derived from the fact that the eight manufacturers had exclusive dealing arrangements
with 80% of the retailers and that 60% of this exclusive dealing was established by contract. See supra notes
71-78 and accompanying text (setting forth the relevant percentages).
124. This number is derived from the fact that the 3 manufacturers had exclusive dealing arrangements
with over 50% of the retailers and 60% of this exclusive dealing was established by contract. See supra notes
71-78 and accompanying text (setting forth the relevant percentages).
. 125. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (noting the industry practice of utilizing exclusive dealing
contracts).
126. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (distinguishing the fact situation from one which involves
an industry-wide practice of exclusive dealing).
127. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d at 1251.
128. KINm, supra note 96, at 278-79. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d at
1239.
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an antitrust violation case which concerns exclusive dealing." 9 Therefore, Teltek's case
will also be analyzed under the analytical approach and burden of proof established for
section 1 cases.
Continental T. V., Inc v. G.T.E. Sylvania., Inc.,"' involved an alleged violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.'31 In that case, the issue involved a location restraint, which
is a type of territorial restraint, placed on franchisees. 132 Interpreting section 1 of the
Sherman Act, the Court adopted the rule of reason analysis for non-price vertical
restraints. The rule of reason analysis takes into consideration both the anticompetitive
impact and the procompetitive effects of a vertical restraint. 34 While this decision is
significant for the rule it adopted, it has been criticized as giving little guidance for applying
the rule.' 35 Some of the procompetitive economic effects which were identified by the
Court included assistance at market entry,136 fostering promotional and service activities
and protecting them against free rider problems,3 7 and protection of product quality and
customer safety.'38 The Court stated further that interbrand competition was the primary
concern of antitrust law.
39
In addition to having its complaint subject to the rule of reason analysis under the
Sherman Act, the plaintiff also bears a greater burden of proof than the burden of proof for
a violation of the Clayton Act. 4 ° Under section 3 of the Clayton Act, the plaintiff must
prove that the effect of the contract may be to substantially lessen competition.' 4 ' In
contrast, under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that the challenged
129. See, e.g. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finly & Co., 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1975). American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 521 F.2d 1230 (3rd Cir. 1975) (providing examples of
plaintiffs pleading violations of both acts).
130. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
131. Id. at 36.
132. Id. It must be noted that this type of vertical restraint impacts intrabrand competition, and one of its
justifications is that it can enhance interbrand competition. SULiVAN & HARRISON, supra note 6, at 148. This
differs from exclusive dealing where the primary impact is on interbrand competition. Id. at 178.
133. Id at 59. One of the most frequently cited statements of the rule of reason states that
[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress of even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restrain was imposed the nature of the
restraint and its effect, natural or probable.
Id. at 50 n.15 quoting Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
134. Id at 54-56.
135. James, R. Rill, Non-Price Vertical Restraints Since Sylvania: Market Conditions and Dual
Distributions, 52 ANTrrRUST L. L 95, 95-96 (1983) [hereinafter Rill]. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 6,
at 170.
136. Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 54.
137. Id. at 55.
138. Id, at 55 n.23.
139. Id. at 51 n.19.
140. Tampa Electric Coal Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. at 335 -We need not discuss the
respondents' further contention that the contract also violates § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act, for if it does not
fall within the broader proscription of § 3 of the Clayton Act it follows that it is not forbidden by those of the
former." Id.
141. 15. U.S.C. § 14 (1993).
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practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade.'42 This entails a greater showing of
anticompetitive effect, as compared to the procompetitive effect.'43 The limited number
of cases which have upheld a finding of an unreasonable restraint on trade demonstrate the
difficulty of carrying this burden of proof under the rule of reason analysis.'"
However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's decision, in Eiberger v. Sony Corp of
America,4 5 gives some guidance as to the factors that.Teltek has to establish in order to
be successful on the merits in a case concerning territorial restraint, which differs from
exclusive dealing.'46
The plaintiff had been an authorized dealer of Sony office equipment. 4 ' He alleged
that the warranty fees extracted from dealers by Sony Corp. of America (Sonam) when
dealers sold products outside of their designated sales area, and that his termination by
Sonam for his refusal to pay those fees violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.'48 The court
found that Sonam employed the warranty fee system as a means to enforce territorial
restraints on its distributorships. 49 This restraint resulted in the anticompetitive effect of
decreased intrabrand competition.'
Sonam attempted to justify this restraint by arguing that this system was required to
provide customer service, and that its status as a new entrant made this restraint
reasonable.' 5 ' However, the court found that Sonam's intent in adopting this revised
warranty system was not to ensure customer service but instead was created to protect
territories, since customer service had been established by its previous warranty system.'52
Additionally, the court discounted Sonam's argument that it needed this device as a new
entrant in the market, on the grounds that it had gained twelve percent of the market share
in its four years of' business, was continuing to grow, and that Sonam and four other
manufacturers accounted for ninety-six percent of the total sales.'53 The court further
found that the elimintation of intrabrand competition allowed the dealers to maintain their
142. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 49. The restriction in franchise agreement
between manufacturer o r televisions and retailer restricting the sales location was judged under the rule of reason
analysis to determine whether the agreement imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade. Id.
143. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d at 1275 (raising section 1 of the
Sherman Act as a defense in case involving exclusive concession franchise contract for event at major baseball
stadium). The court stated that the analysis of section 3 cases applied to section 1 cases; however, the burden
of proof is greater in the latter. Id.
144. See Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560,1578 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (affining
jury verdict finding that territorial restraints placed an unreasonable restraint on trade). See Eiberger v. Sony
Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming the trial court's verdict that the warranty
system that was used to maintain the distributorships' territorial restraints placed an unreasonable restraint on
trade).
145. 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980).
146. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (distinguishing the competitive impact of these restraints).
147. Id at 1070.
148. Id The machines carried a ninety day service warranty, and the dealership agreement provided that
the dealer would take responsibility for this service. Id at 1070-71.
149. Id. at 1079. The warranty system which existed prior to the one under discussion in this litigation
provided that the dealer could transfer the responsibility for service to another dealer and pay a fee. Id at 1071.
The revised system provided that there was an automatic fee charged for each machine sold outside of the
dealer's territory. Id at 1072-73.
150. Id
151. Id at 1078-80.
152. Id at 1077-79.
153. Eiberger v. Sony Corporation of America, 622 F.2d at 1080-81.
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sales at full list price, and in some cases, at substantially above the manufacturer's suggested
list price.154 The court held that given these facts, the warranty system acted as an
unreasonable restraint on trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
15 5
4. Applying the Sherman Act to the Hypothetical
Ascertaining the legality of non-price vertical restraint involves determining first,
whether or not there is a significant anticompetitive effect, and second, whether or not the
procompetitive effects justify the restraint.
In section I exclusive dealing cases, the courts have performed the three-step analysis
defined in Tampa, which applied section 3, to define the extent of the anticompetitive
effect.15 6 Then, if foreclosure is shown, under a rule of reason analysis the defendant will
have an opportunity to justify the restraint. Due to the fact that exclusive dealing primarily
impacts interbrand competition, unlike other vertical restraints, 157 and by itself never
diminishes intrabrand competition,' 5' the analysis will include economic factors relevant
to exclusive dealing which are not necessarily the same factors relevant to other types of
non-price vertical restraints, such as the territorial restraint in Sylvania.'51
a. Plaintiff's Case-in-Chief" Anticompetitive Effects
The analysis regarding line of commerce, market delineation and degree of foreclosure
set forth in the Clayton Act section of this Comment is applicable to the threshold issues
which Teltek must establish in a section 1 case." ° To briefly summarize, at a minimum
the hypothetical manufacturer's contractual ties have foreclosed thirty percent of the retailer
outlets and a similar percentage of the market share.' 6' The foreclosure could be found to
be as great as forty eight percent. 6 2 However, due to the necessity of proving an
unreasonable restraint on trade with the Sherman Act, this foreclosure will not by itself
establish an antitrust violation. A court will consider the foreclosure in light of the
availability of alternative methods of entry. 63 Therefore, when addressing the foreclosure
154. Id at 1080.
155. Id
156. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d at 1275. American Motor Inns,
Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d at 1250. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (setting forth the
three step analysis).
157. SULuIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 6, at 177-78.
158. Steuer, supra note 96, at 109.
159. Id. at 113.
160. See KINmER,supra note 96 at 281 (noting that lower courts have freely applied the Supreme Court's
Clayton Act analyis approach to cases under section 1 of the Sherman Act). See supra notes 118-27 and
accompanying text (analyzing the hypothetical situation under section 3 of the Clayton Act).
161. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
163. Steuer, supra note 96, at 123-24. Analysis of alternative methods of entry may also be relevant to
an allegation of a violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act. In Joyce Beverages v. Crown Royal Cola Co., 555
F.Supp. 271, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the court noted that the Seven Up Company had not carried its burden of
proving that its product was foreclosed from the market because distributors, besides the defendant, had
expressed a willingness to distribute its new product called LIKE; the defendant was not the company's only
choice for a distributor, just its first choice; and, LIKE could not be considered a new entrant considering the
prestige, resources, and contacts of the Seven Up corporation. Id
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 6
issue in its case in chief, Teltek must present evidence disputing the availability and
effectiveness of the outlets which are not tied to the manufacturers, specifically Japanese
import agents and vertical integration.
When decidin:g whether to market a product, one of the primary criteria for the sogo
shosha, the large trading companies in Japan, appears to be whether or not the products will
compete directly with the domestic products which the firm is already carrying.'"' As for
the utilization of tile smaller sole import agents, this can be an unsatisfactory alternative
because the manufacturer frequently has to relinquish control of marketing, selling price, and
sales promotion."ce
Additionally, Teltekshould present evidence on the obstacles it faces in establishing its
own network of distribution by becoming vertically integrated. Vertical integration means
the company attempting to enter the market has to operate both as a manufacturer and as a
retailer.l"' This siglnificantly raises the cost of entry into the market."6 Rental costs for
warehouses are fifty to one hundred percent higher than all of the other industrialized
countries, and rental for retail stores runs one hundred to two hundred percent higher.16
Furthermore, the legal restrictions on wholesaling and retailing act as an added deterrence
to vertical integration for Teltek. 69
The evidence demonstrates a substantial degree of foreclosure and a lack of alternative
channels. For Teltek, it is possible to argue that at least at the threshold stage, its antitrust
case is stronger than that of Eiberger. The basis for this contention rests in the nature of the
anticompetitive effects involved. The market foreclosure with Teltek causes an interbrand
anticompetitive effect in the marketplace, whereas the anticompetitive effect which the court
found in Eiberger concerned intrabrand competition.1 7 The Sylvania decision implicitly
establishes that intrabrand competition is of greater concern than interbrand competition.1
7
'
Having alleged an interbrand anticompetitive effect and having demonstrated a significant
amount of foreclosure, a court should find that Teltek satisfied the threshold question of
substantial restraint and place the burden on the defendants to justify this restraint.
b. Defendants' Case-in-Chief
The balancing, or rule of reason, analysis entails consideration of procompetitive
interbrand effects. The defendants will argue that their exclusive dealing agreements are
attractive to both the buyer, who ensures a dependable source of supply, and the seller, who
gains a ready market. 7 2 They will assert that having the dealers focus their efforts and
164. PHASE 1, supra note 15, at 36.
165. L at 41. Sole import agents may also engage in exclusive dealing contracts with the manufacturers
whose products it decides to import. Id This tends to negate their potential as an alternative distribution channel.
Id
166. SuLuIvAN & HARRIsoN, supra note 6, at 179.
167. Id. See Steuer, supra note 96, at 124.
168. PHASE 1, supra note 15, at 124 (referring to a presentation before the Japanese Fair Trade
Commission).
169. See i (giving a brief description the most significant impediments).
170. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text (describing the territorial restraint in Eiberger).
171. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Sylvania decision).
172. SULLivAN & HARRIsoN, supra note 6, at 179. See, PHASE I, supra note 15, at 105.
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their resources on promoting one product line is more effective1" and promotes interbrand
competition. t74
The defendants will also argue that the structure of distribution keiretsu enables them
to reduce distribution costs by simplifying marketing channels, allowing bulk shipments, and
rationalizing inventory controls.175 Furthermore, they will assert that the agreements have
resulted in many benefits in the service arena, such as promoting customer service by
emphasizing specialized knowledge and experience, improving post-sale service, and
maintaining quality control. 176
c. Plaintiff's Rebuttal
Teltek has two primary arguments with which to rebut the defendants' evidence of
procompetitive effect. First, there is considerable doubt about whether any of the cost
savings of the distribution keiretsu have been passed on to the Japanese consumer.
Investigation into the results of the exclusive dealing in the distribution keiretsu have
indicated that:
Reductions in marketing costs, for example, are seldom passed on to customers.
This is because the aim of the keiretsu integration in distribution is to stabilize
prices at the distribution stage by promoting product differentiation. Interbrand
competition is eliminated by distribution keiretsu and the manufacturer's business
and pricing policies are more easily realized even without binding instructions
177
Second, commentators who advocate these procompetitive effects have placed caveats
on their arguments supporting exclusive dealing. They admit that exclusive dealing will pose
a substantial barrier to entry where a large percentage of the industries' retail outlets are
already foreclosed. 17 This is precisely the factual situation which Teltek is facing. Eighty
percent of the retail outlets are tied to manufacturers and sixty percent of these ties are
contractual.
Other commentators have suggested that a highly concentrated market can contribute
to the anticompetitive effect. 179 The market in Japan has been characterized as strongly
oligopolistic."' This structure severely limits price competition.' In Japan, the power
173. PHASE I, supra note 15, at 105.
174. SuLUvAN & HARRISON, supra note 6, at 179 (1988). See generally, Steuer, supra note 96 at 124-33.
175. PHASE I, supra note 15, at 56.
176. Id,
177. It (quoting Hideto Ishida, Anticompetitive Practices in the Distribution of Goods and Services in
Japan: The Problem of the Distribution Keiretsu, 2 J. JAPANESE STUD. 324-25 (1983)).
178. Cf Marvel, supra note 78, at 5 (noting that exclusive dealing may be adopted as a means to erect
barriers to entry to competing manufacturers). See also, Steuer supra note 96, at 130 "[U]nderlying the
procompetitive effects of exclusive dealing is the need for enough distributors to serve every supplier. If an
exclusive dealing arrangement significantly forecloses other suppliers, the arrangement may inhibit rather than
promote interbrand competition." Id.
179. Panel Discussion, ANTITRUST DOS AND DONTS OF DISTRmUTIoN, 52 ANTITRUST L. J. 363, 382
(1984)(comment by Mr. Joshua Greenberger). See Rill, supra note 188, at 108.
180. BAZER & LAUMER, supra note 67, at 195.
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of this small group of firms manifests itself in the firms' ability to establish RPM, 8 2
thereby retaining the procompetitive benefits within the keiretsu rather than passing the
savings on to consumers.
Teltek can refute the consumer cost savings procompetitive effect of the structure. It
can also show that the composition of the Japanese market eliminates many of the
procompetitivebenefits that are thought to flow from exclusive dealing. Teltek may be able
to narrow the issues down to the point where a court will have to weigh the substantial
foreclosure versus the explanation that the structure provides better service. Due to the
eighty percent foreclosure, it is unlikely that this single business reason will provide
sufficient justification for the court to hold that this is a reasonable restraint. By finding that
this is an unreasonable restraint on trade, a court could then hold the defendants in violation
of U.S. antitrust laws, specifically section 1 of the Sherman Act.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As demonstraed, the exclusive dealing of the keiretsu may violate both the Sherman Act
and the Clayton Act. Thus, it must be determined whether a court possesses subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. Both statutes contain jurisdictional language in their
text. However, while the Sherman Act contains a statutory provision for subject matter
jurisdiction governing extraterritorial application, the Clayton Act contains no similar subject
matter jurisdiction provision.183 Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction under each of these
statutes must be analyzed separately.
1. The Sherman Act
The landmark decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica8 4 established the
broad jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act and articulated the "effects" test.8 5 In
Alcoa, the foreign aluminum producers had imposed a quota on the production and sale of
aluminum, including restraints on imports into the U.S.'8 6 The court held that if the
agreement to impose quotas was intended to and did affect U.S. imports or exports, the
Sherman Act would apply."8 7 Subsequently, courts reformulated the test for extraterritorial
subject matter jurisdiction in a myriad of ways. 8 Congress also perceived the need for
legislative action :o resolve the problems resulting from these inconsistent standards. 89
181. SULLIvAN &c HARRISON, supra note 6, at 33. If one seller increases output and reduces its price in
an effort to capture more sales, other producers of the oligopoly would follow suit. Id at 32-33. If the price
change is not concealed, this reaction will be swift. Il at 33. The price cutter will gain little. Id. From this
scenario, it follows that there is little incentive for price competition. lId The more interdependence that exists
among firms in an oligopoly, the more the market may result in conduct similar to a monopoly. Id.
182. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
183. Chatham Condominium Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1010 (5th Cir. 1979)
(describing the jurisdictional scope of the Clayton Act as being much narrower than the Sherman Act).
184. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
185. See Peter N. Swan, International Antitrust: The Reach and Efficacy of United States Law, 63 OR. L.
REV. 177, 196-199 (describing briefly the maturation of the effects doctrine).
186. Id at 440-4.1.
187. Ia at 444.
188. Murphy, supra note 96, at 807.
189. H.R. REP. No. 686,97th Cong., 2d Ses. 6,9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2487.
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In 1982, Congress amended the Sherman Act by passing the Export Trading Company
Act, which added section 7 of the Sherman Act."9 This section sets forth the conditions
for subject matter jurisdiction that must exist in a case involving trade or commerce with
other nations before the provisions of the Sherman Act will apply.191 The statute provides
in part:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce
(other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless (1) such
conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect... (B) on
export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, or a person engaged in such
trade or commerce in the United States; and such effect gives rise to a claim under
section 1 to 7 of this title other than this section. 92
Teltek will have to prove the following elements in order to establish a court's subject
matterjurisdiction. First, the actions of the keiretsu must fall within the category of "conduct
involving trade or commerce.., with foreign nations." 9 3 Second, the effect of this
conduct must be direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable.1 94 Third, Teltek must be
included in the classification of persons engaged in export trade within the United
States. 95
In order to determine the conduct this statute encompasses, it is helpful to refer to the
rationales for subject matter jurisdiction developed through Sherman Act jurisprudence
dealing with conduct in interstate commerce."9 In the interstate setting, a court has subject
matter jurisdiction where the conduct is in the flow of interstate commerce, or the conduct
affects interstate commerce. 197 Conduct of an intrastate nature having an affect on
interstate commerce is included in the latter category.'98 Therefore, in the context of
commerce with foreign nations, the conduct must either be in the flow of foreign commerce
or affect export commerce. 99 A difference exists in the foreign context where the
restrictive practice itself must have a substantial effect.2"
190. Pub. L. No. 97-2920, 96 Stat. 1246 (Oct. 8, 1982).
191. 15 U.S.C. §6(a) (1993). The codification of a jurisdictional standard presents businesspeople and
attorneys with an explicit standard against which to assess whether certain conduct will trigger application of
the Sherman Act. Murphy, supra note 96 at 805-806.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1993).
193. Murphy, supra note 96, at 791.
194. Id. at 807.
195. See The 'In' Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F.Supp. 494 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (dismissing
an antitrust claim because foreign company plaintiff failed to meet the jurisdictional requirement of section 7).
196. Murphy, supra note 96, at 792.
197. Id A consensus exists that the foreign commerce clause of the previous Sherman Act was approached
in the same manner. Id
198. Id
199. Id
200. Id at 802. In the interstate commerce setting, it is sufficient if the conduct effects a substantial
amount of interstate commerce. Id There is no requirement that the restraint be substantial as in the foreign
context. Id
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While all of the manufacturers in the hypothetical engage in export trade to the U.S., the
conduct being challenged by Teltek occurs completely within Japan's borders.20 '
Therefore, Teltek must prove the exclusive dealing affects foreign commerce, and that this
effect is substantial. There is no clear standard for when the effect can be considered
substantial. 2  However, Teltek could plead the following facts. The eight K
manufacturers account for eighty percent of the total sales in the market. They are tied to
over eighty percent of the distribution channels. The restrictive effect this system has had
on foreign commerce is shown by the fact that penetration into the Japanese market for
consumer electronics from any non-Japanese manufacturer has been limited to three percent
of the market.0 3 Additionally, Teltek should include in its pleadings the details of its
attempt to enter into the Japanese market. ° With these pleadings, Teltek should be able
to establish that there was a substantial effect on U.S. export commerce.
The second element required to establish subject matter jurisdiction is a demonstration
of a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on foreign commerce. 2°S The
discussion above confirms that the exclusive dealing has had a substalitial effect on U.S.
export commerce. Whether the effect was direct and reasonably foreseeable remains to be
proven.
Few cases have arisen, subsequent to the amendment to the Sherman Act, which address
the issue of what is considered a direct effect.2°" Therefore, it is necessary to refer to case
law antedating the amendment to define the term direct. In Sulmeyer v. Seven- Up Co.,2 7
the plaintiff alleged that the defendants' agreements with bottlers in foreign countries, which
201. Daishowa International v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cases 66,774, 1982 WL 1850.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had formed buyer's cartel which fixed the price for export wood chips
and boycotted plainitff who refused to accept the trading conditions. M, at *1-*2. The primary defendant in this
case, a Japanese corporation, alleged that all of the challenged conduct occurred outside of the U.S. Id. at *4.
The District Court held that there was subject matter jurisdiction. Id at *6.
202. See 'imberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America 549 F.2d 597, 611 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that the
nature of the effect required for jurisdiction has been discussed in only a few cases and that the standard has
not been put to a real test).
203. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (setting forth both the actual and hypothetical
foreclosure percentages).
204. See Continrntal Ore Company v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (involving claims that
defendants violated section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing, by conspiring to monopolize,
and by conspiring to restrain trade). The plaintiff pleaded specific instances where its attempts to enter and
maintain itself in the market were frustrated. Id at 694.
205. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements for subject matter
jurisdiction).
206. See Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer, Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1102, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dismissing the
complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to establish that the conduct resulted in an anticompetitive
effect on U.S. commerce). See The 'In' Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F.Supp. 494,500 (dismissing
on the grounds that a; a foreign company, plaintiff did not fulfill the jurisdictional requirements). See also
McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissing on the grounds there was no
anticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce); Limamuiga Tours v. Travel Impressions, 617 F.Supp. 920, 924
(E.D.N.Y. 1985). A destination service operator (DSO), which provided local services for tour customers on a
Caribbean Island, charged a wholesale tour operator with antitrust violation alleging that the DSO's exclusion
from the market resulted in an anticompetitive effect on American consumers. XL at 924. The court found that
if there was any direct anticompetitive effect it would experienced by the travel agencies, not the consumers.
Id. at 925. As the defendant in the case was the largest tour agency, it would suffer if there was any
anticompetitive effect,;. IL The court considered this to be an "absurd twist" and held that there was no
anticompetitive effect. ML at 924-25.
207. 411 P. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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prohibited these bottlers from producing soft drinks of the same flavor as the defendant's,
precluded plaintiff from access to the markets, resulted in a monopoly, and restrained
trade." 8 The plaintiff was engaged in the business of supplying Bubble Up concentrate
to franchised bottlers in foreign countries, and the defendant, Seven Up, conducted a similar
business.2" The court held that plaintiff's allegations that the products were in direct
competition and that defendants' actions limited plaintiff's business were sufficient to
establish direct harm, a prerequisite for standing to sue.
210
Teltek and the Japanese manufacturers engage in the business of manufacturing
camcorders. Teltek is alleging that the agreements between the Japanese manufacturers,
wholesalers, and retailers prohibit these dealers from selling the same type of product from
a competitor and preclude Teltek from access to the Japanese market. For the reason that
Teltek can establish that its camcorders are in direct competition with the cameorders of the
Japanese manufacturer and that their actions restrict its business, according to Sulmeyer v.
Seven-Up Co., Teltek can establish direct harm.
The final element entails demonstrating that the effect was reasonably foreseeable. This
portion of the statute replaced the judicial proof requirement of intent, thereby introducing
a more objective standard.21' This standard is a variant of the reasonable person
standard.1 2
Teltek must show that a reasonable person exercising practical businessjudgment would
realize that exclusive dealing would have a direct and substantial effect on U.S.
exporters." 3 The anticompetitive effect of the exclusive dealing arrangements may not
have been reasonably foreseeable when initially entered; however, this does not prevent a
U.S. court from possessing subject matter jurisdiction.2 4 The court's jurisdiction will be
limited to conduct occurring during the period in which the anticompetitive effect on foreign
commerce was foreseeable.2 1  As the discussion in the section of the history of the
zaibatsu and keiretsu demonstrates,2 1 6 business practices developed during the rebuilding
of the Japanese economy may have been rational at the time. However, as Japan evolved
into a world economic leader, trade with Japan has assumed increasing importance, and its
barriers to trade have received an increasing amount of criticism from its trading
partners.217 In light of this situation, it is arguable that the manufacturers were able to
reasonably foresee the effect on the rest of the world's exports to Japan by their continued
foreclosure of distribution channels.
The third condition for establishing subject matter jurisdiction canbe easily satisfied by
Teltek introducing evidence of its status as a U.S. corporation engaged in export commerce.
Upon having fulfilled the requirements of establishing the subject matter jurisdiction of the
208. I1 at 637.
209. Id. at 637.
210. Id. at 638-39.
211. Murphy, supra note 96, at 807.
212. Id&
213. Id. at 808.
214. ItE at 809.
215. Id
216. See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text (describing the structures and their evolution).
217. JoHNsoN, supra note 14, at 238. During the general meeting of GATT in 1959, the U.S. and western
European countries were calling for Japan to open its markets to foreign products. bia The U.S. government is
still making this request in 1993. Schlesinger, supra note 11, at All.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 6
U.S. court, Teltek could proceed with the substantive merits of its section 1 antitrust
claim. 2
18
2. The Clayton Act
Unlike the Sherman Act, the extraterritorial reach of section 3 of the Clayton Act is not
expressly delineated. Therefore, in order to determine jurisdiction under the Clayton Act,
it is necessary to address additional issues that were not present in the analysis of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. These concerns include whether section 3 has
extraterritorial reach and whether its breadth encompasses conduct which occurs completely
outside the U.S. but which affects U.S. export commerce.
The first issue is whether section 3 reaches any extraterritorial conduct. The text of
section 3, which includes its jurisdictional language, provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce... [to] make a sale or contract for sale of. . .commodities... for use,
consumption, or resale within the United States... on the condition, agreement, or
understanding, that the... purchaser thereof shall not... deal in the commodities
of a competitor.., where the effect may be... to lessen competition .... 219
Section 1 of the Clayton Act defines "commerce" to include "trade or commerce...
with foreign nations."22" The use of this language appears to indicate that there will be
some extraterritori al enforcement of the Clayton Act. However, within section 3 itself, the
language becomes more restrictive by referring only to sales of commodities "for use,
consumption, or resale within the United States."22' The utilization of this phrase in some
sections of the Clayton Act, along with its absence in other sections indicates that
extraterritorial application of the Clayton Act is selective.222 For the reason that all of the
camcorders are sold within Japan, Teltek cannot satisfy the requirement of use, consumption,
or resale within the U.S.223 Therefore, Teltek will not be able to establish subject matter
jurisdiciton under the Clayton Act and will not be allowed to prove the substantive merits
of its Clayton Act claim.
218. Murphy, supra note 96, at 813. Under section 7, comity is a separate issue that a court may address.
See id. (citing to the House Report regarding the passage of the bill). See supra notes 224-38 and accompanying
text (addressing the issue of comity).
219. 15 U.S.C. 1; 14 (1993).
220. 15 U.S.C. 1; 12 (1993).
221. 15. U.S.C. § 14 (1993).
222. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Using Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign Companies:
A Step to Even the Odds in International Trade, 27 VA. J. INTL. L. 211, 242 (1987) (noting the language
difference between section 2(a) (15 U.S.C. § 13(a)) and 2(c) (15 U.S.C. § 13(c)) of the Robinson-Patman Act).
223. Reisner v. General Motors Corp., 511 F.Supp. 1167, 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Addressing a fact
situation where all of the component parts were sold in Europe for use in Europe, the court held that these
actions would not satisfy the Clayton Act requirement of use, consumption or resale within the U.S. Id.
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V. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS
The international character of this litigation presents unique litigation concerns. A
company must take into consideration such factors as the potential impact of a conity
analysis a court, foreign discovery capabilities, and recovery potential.
A. Comity
Some argue that problems in the arena of international trade should be addressed by
agreements and negotiations between the governments of the nations involved and not left
for resolution by the U.S. court system.224 The principles of sovereignty and comity act
as the core for these arguments? - The judicial explanation states:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and goodwill upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to the international duty and
convenience, arid to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws. 6
While there are no absolute rules of comity that must be followed, the other sovereign's
interest must be taken into consideration.2 7
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the relevance of this principle in the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law in the celebrated case of Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
ofAmerica, N.T. & S.A.2 " The court established a requirement that a court must find that
"the interest of, and links to, the U.S.-including the magnitude of the effect on American
foreign commerce-are sufficiently strong, vis-a-vis those of other nations, to justify the
assertion of extraterritorial authority."2 9 The Court concluded that the following elements
should be considered when making this determination: (1) the degree of conflict with foreign
law or policy; (2) nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places
of business of corporations; (3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be
expected to achieve compliance; (4) the relative significance of effects on the U.S. as
compared with those elsewhere; (5) the existence and extent of an explicit purpose to harm
or affect U.S. commerce; (6) the foreseeability of such an effect; and (7) the relative
importance to the violations charged of conduct within the U.S. as compared with conduct
abroad. 03°
224. PHASE I: JAPAN'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND OFTIONS FOR IMPROVING U.S. ACCESS, REPORT TO
THE HousE WAYS AND MEANS, H.R. Doc. No. 332-283 121-123 (October 1990) (comments by business
consultants and participants in the SII talks regarding the request that the keiretsu structure be eliminated).
225. A.D. NrALE & M.L STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESs and NAnTONAL JURISDICTION 12-13 (1988)
[hereinafter NEALE & STEPHENS].
226. Hilton v. Guyot, 16 U.S. 139, 143 (1895).
227. NEAI.E & STEPHENS, supra note 225, at 13.
228. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that the activities which had occurred in Honduras were within
the jurisdiction of federal courts under the Sherman Act).
229. Id. at 613.
230. 1&
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In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corporation,231 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals expressed substantial agreement with the Timberlane factors and added the
following criteria to be considered in the balancing of the sovereign's interest: (1) the
availability of a remedy abroad and pendency of foreign litigation; (2) the effect on U.S.
foreign relations of U.S. judicial relief; (3) whether compliance with U.S. relief will place
defendant in an untenable position vis-a-vis foreign law; (4) whether the U.S. would find a
similar order by the foreign government acceptable if roles were reversed; and (5) the
preemptive effect of any treaty."sa Most courts have adopted, with some variations, these
considerations and the comity balancing test.233 However, in LakerAirways Limited v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,234 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the utility
and wisdom of comity interest balancing in the determination of the exercise of
jurisdiction. 5
When it amended the Sherman Act with the addition of Section 6(a), which deals with
subject matter jurisdiction, Congress did not intend to affect the courts' authority to consider
comity as a grounds for declining to adjudicate a case.231 In the cases which have applied
this section and found that the court does have subject matter jurisdiction, the traditional
comity balancing analysis has been performed.2 7 Therefore, a litigant in most situations
must be prepared to) argue that international comity concerns do not prohibit the court from
adjudicating their claim.23
231. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the court had subject matterjurisdiction where 2 American
litigants were challenging alleged antitrust activities abroad and had harmed export business).
232. Id at 1297-98.
233. National Benk of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6,8 (2d Cir. 1981) (retaining the comity
balancing test while rejecting the first 2 parts of the tripartite Timberlane test for subject matter jurisdiction).
234. 731 F. 2d S09 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (granting a preliminary injunction designed to permit U.S. claim to
go forward free from foreign interference).
235. Id. at 950.
236. H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 189, at 13. The House Report states that "the bill [H.R. 5235] is
intended neither to prevent nor encourage additional recognition of the special international characteristics of
transactions." Id Additionally, in his presentation of the bill on the floor of the House of representative, Rep.
McClory stated that "ILR. 5235 in no way affects the authority of the court to consider such matters [such as
comity] in cases where there is an anticompetitive domestic effect arising from exports or foreign trade." 128
CONG. REc.H4982 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1982).
237. In re Insurrmnce Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.Supp. 464, 487 (N.D. Cal. 1989) "Regardless of whether
subject matter jurisdicion exists, this Court may determine that its jurisdiction under the antitrust laws should
not be exercised on the grounds of international comity." Id In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 938 F.2d 919,
933 (1991) (stating that the comity analysis is still relevant even though the requirements under U.S.C. § 6(a)
will make it unusual for a court to find subject matter jurisdiction and then abstain from jurisdiction due to
comity principle).
238. See Daishowa International v. North Coast Export Company, 1982-2 Trade Cases 64,774, 1982 WL
1850 (1982) (applying the Sherman Act to a Japanese buyers cartel where the alleged conduct occurred abroad).
The court noted that there appeared to be no conflict with Japanese law. Id. at *5-*6. Additionally, the court
considered it significant that the plaintiff would be unable to recover punitive damages if the case was litigated
in Japan. Id
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B. Discovery Difficulties
A company seeking to obtain foreign discovery faces several potential barriers. It is a
costly and time consuming procedure. 9 Additionally, even though Japan has not done
so yet, a number of countries have passed legislation designed to block U.S. antitrust
investigation by giving the country the power to forbid compliance with the discovery
request."4
C. Potential Problems with Remedies
One of the enticing features to a plaintiff in a U.S. antitrust suit is the potential to get
treble damages. 241 Some countries have removed this incentive by passing statutes
preventing the enforcement of U.S. antitrust treble damages awards within their territories
or against their citizens.242 An additional statutory disincentive has been created in the
United Kingdom. This provision, referred to as a claw back statute, enables a citizen or
domestic business to recover from the original plaintiff any multiple, meaning non-
compensatory, damage award of a foreign court.243 One reason for these provisions could
be that treble damages awards are viewed as punitive, potentially criminal in character, and
not appropriate for international enforcement under traditional international law
principles. 244 Due to the fact that the awards for private antitrust suits in Japan are
significantly below U.S. awards 245 and that the Japanese government has already
recommended during SII that the U.S. revise its treble damages awards,246 it is arguable
that Japan may follow the example of the United Kingdom.
IV. CONCLUSION
Joining the potential use of U.S. antitrust law as a wedge into the Japanese market with
the perception that keiretsu impede U.S. export trade, this Comment analyzes whether U.S.
antitrust law may successfully challenge the keiretsu. Although there are various keiretsu
structures, the application of U.S. antitrust law was applied only to business practices of the
distribution keiretsu.
239. Antitrust: U.S. Antitrust Laws can be used as Market Access TooL Lawyer Says, INT*L TRADE REP.,
Aug. 19, 1992 at 1417 [hereinafter Market Access Tool]; Mashushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475
U.S. 574, 577-578 (1985). The discovery in the Japanese Antitrust Litigation went on for years and produces
multi-volumes worth of evidence. L But see, Rosenthal & Lipstein, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that this is not
the norm and that at least in some types of antitrust litigation the expenditure of time and resources can be
reduced significantly).
240. See MELv=.E L. STtnENs, "Reasonable' Approaches to the Issue of Extra-Territorial
Jurisdiction-The US Anti-Trust Example' in 2 INTERNATIONAL ANI-TRUST LAW: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
EEC AND U.S. ANI-TRusT 91, 114-15 (Julian Maitland-Walker ed., 1984) (identifying these countries as
Australia, Canada, Belgium, France, The Netherlands, the Philipines and the United Kingdom).
241. Market Access TooL supra note 239, at 1417.
242. STmEnENs, supra note 240, at 114-15.
243. l
244. Ia
245. Antitrust: Structural Impediments Talks, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 1348 (Aug. 5, 1992) [hereinafter
Structural Impediments].
246. Matsushita, supra note 19, at 436-37.
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With regard to whether these practices violate section 3 of the Clayton Act, precedent
from the Supreme Court supports the conclusion that the exclusive dealing agreements of the
keiretsu violate this law. However, a U.S. exporter seeking to use this provision will find
that it faces an impossible subject matter jurisdiction hurdle. Therefore, the Clayton Act
cannot be used as a tool to access the Japanese market.
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a U.S. exporter will have an easier time
establishing subject matter jurisdiction. However, such a plaintiff will face an obstacle in
the form of higher burden of proof, namely that an unreasonable restraint of trade must be
established. Additionally, the rule of reason analysis entails that a court take into account
both the anticomp.titive and procompetitive effects of the conduct in question. With the
higher burden of proof and the possible business justifications for exclusive dealing, it is
difficult to predict the outcome of such litigation. However, the potential exists to use the
Sherman Act to wedge into the Japanese market.
The Japanese response to enforcement can take a variety of forms. It may decide to
create barriers to the extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws, including discovery
restrictions or remedy enforcement limitations.' 7 In the alternative, Japan may take the
path of stepping up its own enforcement of its antitrust laws. The Japanese Federal Trade
Commission (JFTC) does currently have an investigation under way regarding some keiretsu
business practices.248 Furthermore, the Japanese government has acknowledged that some
keiretsu practices do act as trade barriers. The JFTC may decided to address the most
egregious practices while leaving the structure intact.
Julie A. Shepard
247. See U.S. Broadens Enforcement, supra note 1, at 622 (reporting that the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade planned to form a committee to explore measures which would prevent the U.S. from
enforcing its antitrust laws in Japan, such as banning Japanese fimns from testifying or surrendering proof to the
U.S. Department of Justice).
248. Structural Impediments, supra note 245, at 1348 (discussing the investigations of the Japan Federal
Trade Commission into the keiretsu which resulted from the Structural Impediments Commission and noting a
scheduled investigation of the exlusionary business practices of the exclusionary effects of keiretsu in the auto,
auto parts, glass and paper industries).
